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Abstract
US public child welfare agencies have faced increasing pressure in the first decade of this century 
to demonstrate efficiency and accountability, even as the Great Recession increased pressures on 
millions of families and undermined human service funding. This paper reports on analyses of the 
two cohorts of local public child welfare agencies from the National Survey of Child and 
Adolescent Well-Being to identify changes in their structure and practice. Local agency 
adaptations have included some structural integration and apparently increased use of 
subcontracting, including investigations. Collectively, these trends appear to be fostering a tighter 
coupling of local child welfare agencies with other service providers. Some of these connections 
may improve families’ access to a range of services. However, the increased reliance on private 
providers may also undermine accountability and flexibility to respond to changing needs.
Keywords
Trends; Child welfare agencies; CPS partnerships
1. Introduction
1.1. Challenges facing local public child welfare agencies in the first decade of this century
Among child-serving organizations, local public child welfare agencies are unique in their 
legal responsibility and authority to respond to all maltreatment reports made within their 
service area, determine which merit investigations or assessments, identify which children 
need either preventive or out of home child protective services (CPS), and subsequently 
determine when these services are no longer needed. Recent decades have presented public 
child welfare agencies with significant challenges, including increasingly complex family 
needs (Testa & Poertner, 2010), an economic recession that undermined the well-being of 
millions of families (Sell, Zlotnik, Noonan, & Rubin, 2010), and an increasing emphasis on 
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evidence-based practice despite a limited base of relevant evidence (Barth, 2008). The 
purpose of this article is to identify some of the environmental factors affecting child welfare 
between 1999 and 2009, examine how local public child welfare agencies evolved during 
this time, and consider potential implications for children and families. In so doing, we focus 
largely on the distinctive attributes of these agencies, including their structure within state 
and local human services; their approaches to decision-making; and how they facilitate 
additional needed services.
As a vital part of the safety net, local public child welfare agencies are both supported and 
scrutinized by a range of stakeholders. These include other local public agencies; state and 
federal child welfare agencies; legislators; advocacy groups; and courts (Benson, 1975; Testa 
& Poertner, 2010). Collectively, these other actors shape child welfare’s regulative and 
normative contexts (Scott, 2001). Each of these actors may also mediate the effects of 
economic trends on resources available to child welfare agencies and their latitude in use 
thereof.
1.2. Regulative and normative environments
Even among human services, child welfare agencies are affected to an unusual extent by 
legal decisions. One common means that advocates have used to improve child welfare 
performance has been class action lawsuits in which agencies are cited as having harmed a 
group of children due to failure to provide services. Most successful cases seeking broad 
reform result in consent decrees, through which agencies commit to remediating actions. 
Courts then oversee implementation of these plans (Oppenheim, Lee, Lichtenstein, Bledsoe, 
& Fisher, 2012). Between 1979 and 2005, over 25 state child welfare agencies were sued or 
placed under federal court order (Kosanovich & Joseph, 2005).
Other ways of improving child welfare agency performance have included accreditation, 
federal reviews, and federal and foundation demonstration programs. The entity now known 
as the Council on Accreditation has accredited private agencies since 1977. Increasingly 
over time, public agencies have followed suit, albeit without clear evidence of impact on 
quality (Mays, 2004; OIG, 1994). In addition, a growing number of states have either 
encouraged or required local agencies to become accredited (Stoparic, 2005). Since the 
passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act in 1997, all state child welfare systems have 
been required to undergo federal Child and Family Service Reviews (CFSRs), with financial 
penalties possible for deficiencies. Some public child welfare agencies have also responded 
to stakeholder pressure by conducting outcome evaluations such as those funded through 
Social Security Act federal Title IV-E block grants (Solomon, 2002).
The array of mechanisms for maintaining child welfare agency accountability attests to the 
salience of market and evidence-based institutional logics in US human services. The shift 
from a previous “logic of confidence and good faith” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 357) to that 
of new public management included the landmark Government Performance and Results Act 
of 1993 (GPRA), which required state agencies receiving federal funding to track goals and 
objectives for their major programs (Patti, 2008). Since then, human service agencies have 
been increasingly expected to use data for demonstrating effectiveness as well as efficiency. 
Even before GPRA, however, states were required to report data on child maltreatment 
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reports and outcomes, with the National Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect serving 
as a repository for these and other national child welfare data since 1988 (Waldfogel, 2000).
Two major recent economic trends have also shaped child welfare services. First, public 
children’s services have become increasingly reliant on state and federal funding, including 
Medicaid (Scarcella, 2006). The federal match for state Medicaid spending makes Medicaid-
reimbursed services less expensive for child welfare agencies than those funded exclusively 
from their own budgets. One consequence of increasing child welfare agency referrals to 
Medicaid-reimbursed services is that eligible families can at least in theory select any 
Medicaid participating provider for those services, most of which are private. This may not 
only increase the range of options available to families and buffer service access from 
vicissitudes in local funding, but can also complicate child welfare coordination challenges.
A second major economic factor was the “Great Recession” beginning in 2007. As tax 
revenues dropped, many states cut funding for human services (Smith et al., 2009). At the 
same time, increasing numbers of families experienced poverty (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & 
Smith, 2010), a factor which has previously been found to increase risk of child 
maltreatment (Shook, 1999). Even when the recession officially ended, its repercussions 
continued for the millions of un- or under-employed Americans and the agencies struggling 
to meet their needs (NACCHO, 2012). A GAO report based on four states identified 
significant gaps in services for families involved in child welfare, most notably in substance 
abuse treatment and material support such as housing (GAO, 2013).
Local public child welfare agencies have adapted to recent pressures in part through 
supplementing Title IV-B funds allocated for child welfare services with additional federal 
funding from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the Social Services Block 
Grant Program (SSBG), and Medicaid to support services and activities covered by Title IV-
B, a part of Title IV focused on child welfare services (GAO, 2013). Other strategies used by 
public agencies include an increased use of performance-based contracting with private child 
welfare agencies (Collins-Camargo, McBeath, & Ensign, 2011).
1.3. System integration
The Children’s Bureau has recently outlined its vision for the future of child welfare 
services as “comprehensive evidence-based and evidence-informed community-based 
services… available to families through their local child welfare agencies and other key 
public and private partners” (Mitchell et al., 2012, p.551). Although these authors advocate 
looking “beyond existing organizational boundaries”, (p. 552) we believed it would be 
useful to begin our inquiry by identifying which other health and human services are 
situated within the same larger agencies as local public CPS and whether these 
organizational arrangements have changed over time. State and local elected officials have 
sometimes reorganized human services into “umbrella” agencies in attempts to improve 
coordination of related services and gain efficiencies. At the state level, most states have 
departments of social or human services, many of which also include mental health, public 
health, and other services. We saw any trends toward integration with such services within 
common umbrella agencies as potential opportunities for improved service access and 
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outcomes through both direct connections and possible help in improving cooperation with 
other local public and private providers.
1.4. Structured decision-making
Assessing risk of future maltreatment is a fundamental part of child welfare services, a high 
stake calculation that despite continuing research remains fraught with uncertainty. Even 
among families in which children are clearly at risk, child welfare agencies must direct their 
limited resources toward those in immediate danger. Another reason to provide child 
protection judiciously is its inherently intrusive nature. Most states use structured decision-
making tools to inform these decisions, with the intent of thus focusing on children with the 
most need and improving predictability of decisions across staff members (D’Andrade, 
Austin, & Benton, 2008). In turn, such consistency can help to ensure that child welfare 
makes decisions based on risks rather than on family race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status 
(Gambrill & Shlonsky, 2000; Rycus, Hughes, Lindsey, & Shlonsky, 2008). Of the two 
predominant approaches to risk assessment, consensus-based guidelines take a 
comprehensive approach, often incorporating expert opinion, and generally using the same 
instrument to predict all types of maltreatment. Actuarial models use weighted combinations 
of factors noted by caseworkers on checklists to generate points indicating level of risk, and 
use different factors to predict physical abuse versus neglect. Overall, actuarial models have 
demonstrated better predictive validity than consensus-based guidelines (D’Andrade et al., 
2008); hence, a trend toward their use could improve alignment between CPS and family 
needs.
1.5. Subcontracting
Throughout the US public sector, private agency provision of government-funded services 
was “perhaps the most significant development in the latter part of the 20th century” 
(Ginsberg, Gibelman, & Patti, 2009, p. 93). Privatization of public services has been a 
prominent feature of US social welfare beginning with the Nixon administration’s New 
Federalism initiative, and has in recent decades increasingly progressed from such relatively 
simple functions as garbage disposal to complex human services (Gronbjerg, 2009; 
Salamon, 2012). In essence, privatization was built on the assumption that competition 
would prompt providers to offer services at lower cost and higher quality (Sclar, 2001). The 
reduced cost was expected from both efficiencies that private providers would achieve in 
order to win contracts and the flexibility to terminate contracts when any given services were 
not needed (Milward & Provan, 2000). Similarly, private providers were expected to be more 
motivated than previously monopolistic public agencies to earn contracts through improved 
quality. In addition, a more diverse range of non-governmental providers was expected to be 
more innovative and responsive than public agencies to local needs (Suleimann, 2003).
There is, at present, greater evidence concerning the growth of privatization in child welfare 
systems than on its fiscal and service delivery consequences for child welfare-involved 
children and families (Collins-Camargo et al., 2011). In the mid-1990s, some states 
privatized family preservation, foster care, and adoption services either regionally or state-
wide (Blackstone, Buck, & Hakim, 2004). Quality outcomes appeared more positive than 
cost savings: although both states and private contractors sometimes incurred higher than 
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anticipated costs (Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004), adoption rates improved in Kansas and in Cook 
County, Illinois after privatization (Blackstone et al., 2004; Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004). A 
comparison of Florida counties where child welfare was privatized to otherwise comparable 
counties found generally similar outcomes in child safety, maltreatment recurrence, and 
permanency (Yampolskaya, Paulson, Armstrong, Jordan, & Vargo, 2004). Nonetheless, 
social service stakeholders have raised a range of concerns, including increased reliance on 
private providers that may actually attenuate accountability for complex service processes 
(Van Slyke, 2003). Given the potentially competing pressures for efficiency, government 
accountability for child protection, and family autonomy, as well as substantial if still 
ambiguous implications for cost and quality, we sought to identify whether local public child 
welfare agencies were using private providers for an increasing range of services.
1.6. Other inter-agency cooperation
Child welfare agencies have long depended on other public systems and public and private 
providers to address families’ complex needs. The police, juvenile justice, mental health and 
substance abuse treatment, and schools fulfill such complementary functions as reducing 
potential violence in the short term and addressing behaviors that place children at risk over 
the long term (Bardach, 1998). In addition, such partners can help child welfare workers 
make sense of complex and ambiguous cues about inter-related and dynamic facets of 
families’ needs. At the same time, professionals in other systems often face competing 
demands and bring different beliefs about how to interact with families. To improve 
cooperation and thus family outcomes, child welfare agencies have often developed inter-
agency agreements, cross-trained staff, and pooled resources with other local public agencies 
as well as with both public and private service providers (Casanueva, Horne, Smith, Dolan, 
& Ringeisen, 2011). Thus, the final focus of our study was on how public child welfare 
agency cooperation with other local agencies had changed between 1999 and 2009.
The current study uses data from both cohorts of the National Survey of Child and 
Adolescent Well-being (NSCAW I and II) to depict trends in local public child welfare 
agency structure and practice. The service area for these agencies was typically the county, 
although some served multiple counties or only part of a county. NSCAW is the only 
national, longitudinal study of families subject to child abuse or neglect investigations or 
assessments. Although best known for its focus on children and caregivers, NSCAW also 
included in-depth interviews with local public child welfare agency directors about their 
policy context, structure, services, and relationships with other local child-serving systems.
2. Method
2.1. Sample
Data were drawn from the National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being (NSCAW). 
NSCAW was funded by the Administration for Children and Families within the US 
Department of Health and Human Services, with field data collection carried out by the 
Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International. This survey has now included two cohorts, 
with baseline years 1999 and 2009, respectively.
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Each NSCAW cohort was sampled to represent all children reported to CPS in that year, 
excluding those in states (four in 1999 and eight by 2009) which would have required RTI to 
make the first contact with families (Dowd et al., 2011). For purposes of this paper, the focus 
is on the local child welfare agencies through which these children were sampled. The 
majority of agencies were drawn from the eight states with the largest CPS populations in 
the US; the remainder was drawn from all remaining eligible states. Although the sample 
was not designed to generate a nationally representative sample of agencies, the result was a 
national sample of public local child welfare agencies for each point in time.
Child welfare agency directors, or another individual designated by the director, were 
interviewed in-person only once for each NSCAW cohort, at baseline (Dowd et al., 2011). In 
1999, RTI interviewed directors in 86 of the 92 local agencies from which children were 
sampled for NSCAW. For the 2009 cohort, RTI re-approached all local agencies that had 
participated in 1999, and recruited new agencies to replace those that were ineligible or 
refused. A total of 87 local agencies participated in NSCAW II, all of which also provided 
agency director interviews. Of the 113 unique agencies in NSCAW, 60 participated in both 
1999 and 2009, 27 participated only in 1999, and 26 participated only in 2009. We included 
agencies that participated in only one cohort because RTI chose new agencies for the 2009 
sample both to replace similar agencies that declined to participate again and to represent 
changes in the population of agencies during that time (Dowd et al., 2011). Because the unit 
of analysis for this paper was the local child welfare agency, NSCAW’s probability weights 
were not relevant to the current analysis.
2.2. Measures
All items included in the current study were yes/no questions, coded as binary 1/0 measures.
2.2.1. Regulative and normative environments—External normative pressures faced 
by CPS agencies were measured through four variables. The first variable was coded equal 
to 1 when agency directors answered affirmatively to the question “Is your agency currently 
operating under one or more active consent decrees?”, defined as “a class action suit or court 
order related to child welfare”. The second variable was based on the question “Is your 
agency accredited?” (with the addition in 2009 of “by COA?” – the predominant accrediting 
entity for child welfare agencies). The last two variables measured whether the agency 
“participate[d] in any Federal IV-E waiver demonstration projects related to child welfare” 
or “any other demonstration projects funded by foundation, state, or federally-supported 
grants or initiatives”.
2.2.2. System integration—System integration was operationalized as whether a local 
child welfare agency was described by the director as “a unit within a larger agency” rather 
than “a free-standing entity”. Agency directors who answered affirmatively were then asked 
whether each of the following was also part of the larger agency: income maintenance/
TANF, juvenile justice services, substance use treatment and mental health and/or public 
health.
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2.2.3. Structured decision-making—In 1999, local agency directors were given 
mutually exclusive response options for the question “Which of the following risk 
assessment approaches do you use?” In 2009, response options to this question became non-
mutually exclusive. To compare between years, we constructed three measures: ‘actuarial 
only’ if the agency director chose points among the mutually exclusive choices in 1999 or 
chose points and not guidelines in 2009; ‘guidelines only’ if this option was chosen in 1999 
or guidelines and not points were chosen in 2009; and ‘combination’ if this option was 
chosen in 1999 or respondent chose both points and guidelines in 2009.
2.2.4. Subcontracting—This construct was operationalized as whether a CPS agency 
contracted with another provider for service delivery in any of the following service areas: 
investigation or assessment, family preservation/in-home services, family reunification, 
foster care placements, residential treatment and/or adoptive placements. In 1999, agency 
directors were asked “Is [each specific] service subcontracted?” and in 2009, “For each 
service area, please tell me whether your agency subcontracts any services [in] this area” 
(emphasis added).
2.2.5. Other inter-agency cooperation—Agency directors were asked separately about 
several specific types of cooperation with the police, juvenile justice, drug/alcohol service 
providers, mental health service providers, and education, respectively. For the current 
analyses, we chose the following ties, which were addressed in both 1999 and 2009: inter-
agency agreements or memoranda of understanding (MOU), cross-training of staff, and/or 
joint budgeting or resource allocation (Casanueva et al., 2011).
2.3. Analyses
Change in each agency attribute was tested through a separate regression model using cohort 
(i.e., 2009, vs. 1999) as the independent variable and the given attribute (e.g., operating 
under a consent decree) as the dependent variable. We used the logit link given the binary 
nature of all dependent variables. Generalized estimating equations (GEE) were used 
because these models explicitly incorporate correlation across observations, which was 
relevant for agencies that were surveyed in both 1999 and 2009; GEE estimates are also 
robust in the presence of missing data from survey non-response (such as that which was 
present between the two cohorts). An exchangeable correlation matrix assuming a single 
common correlation (i.e., all off-diagonal elements identical) was chosen as the best 
approximation of the correlation expected from repeated measures (Hardin & Hilbe, 2003). 
This population average approach rather than random effects was optimal for the current 
analyses because we wanted to know whether child welfare agencies changed on average. 
GEE’s weaker assumptions were also preferable given the binary outcomes and the small 
numbers within clusters (i.e., 1–2) and number of agencies (i.e., well under 200) 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
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3.1. Trends in local public child welfare agencies’ regulative and normative environments
Table 1 shows the percentages of agencies reporting each practice in 1999 and 2009, as well 
as the statistical significance of the GEE coefficients assessing the association between 
cohort and each practice. As of 2009, a third of all participating child welfare agencies were 
operating under active consent decrees, making this court-monitored form of service 
improvement as common as accreditation. The majority of agencies in the study sample 
participated in federal IV-E waiver demonstration projects and other foundation, state, and 
federal grants and initiatives. The restriction in the 2009 survey to accreditation by COA 
may explain the slight decrease in the percentage of agencies reporting accreditation (from 
32% in 1999 to 29% in 2009). However, the GEE tests of the association between cohort 
(2009 vs. 1999) and each feature of agency environments suggested that measured features 
of the environment have not changed significantly over time.
3.2. Trends in system integration
There were no significant changes in child welfare agency likelihood of being in a larger 
local agency that also included TANF (55% in 2009), juvenile justice (27% in 2009), or 
substance abuse treatment (31% in 2009). However, by 2009, child welfare agencies were 
more likely to be in agencies that also included mental health (37%, p < 0.01) and/or public 
health departments (34%, p < 0.05). Thus, whereas mental health and public health were the 
least common other human services in the same larger agencies as child welfare in 1999, by 
2009 they were second only to TANF in frequency.
3.3. Trends in structured decision making
The likelihood of agencies using either only actuarial decision making tools (18% in 2009) 
or only non-point based guidelines (26% in 2009) remained roughly consistent. However, 
agencies became more likely to report using a combination of these approaches (from 38% 
in 1999 to 54% in 2009, p < 0.05). Use of structured risk assessments became more likely 
when deciding to investigate cases (from 55% in 1999 to 69% in 2009, p < 0.05), but did not 
change significantly for other key decision junctures.
3.4. Trends in subcontracting
Subcontracting was common in both time periods, but appears to have become more so by 
2009. In 1999, between half and two-thirds of local public child welfare agencies reported 
subcontracting family preservation/in-home services (58%) and residential treatment (64%). 
Approximately one third of agencies reported subcontracting family reunification services 
(34%), foster care placements (35%), and adoptive placements (29%). Only 2% reported 
subcontracting investigation or assessment. By 2009, the majority of agency directors 
reported subcontracting at least some family preservation/in-home services (80%), 
reunification services (70%), foster care placement (80%), residential treatment (76%), and 
adoptive placement (69%), and just over one-fifth of agency directors (21%) reported 
subcontracting at least some investigations or assessments. With the exception of residential 
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treatment, this growth in the use of subcontracting was statistically significant at traditional 
values (p < 0.01).
3.5. Trends in other inter-agency cooperation
Local child welfare agency cooperation with police, juvenile justice, substance abuse 
treatment providers, mental health providers, and schools remained generally stable between 
1999 and 2009. However, joint budgeting or resource allocation became less common with 
police (from 17% to 5%, p < 0.05) and juvenile justice (from 38% to 26%, p < 0.10), 
memoranda of understanding became less likely with mental health service providers (from 
81% to 70%, p < 0.10), and cross-training of staff with education became more common 
(from 41% to 55%, p < 0.10).
4. Discussion
It appears from these findings that the regulative and normative environments surrounding 
public child welfare agencies remained largely unchanged in the first decade of this century. 
Participants in child welfare systems have cited litigation as substantially improving focal 
aspects of agency capacity, such as workforce development, but have also have raised 
concerns about its adversarial nature and potential focus on measurable indicators rather 
than deeper change (Farber & Munson, 2010). Also consistent with 1999, local agencies in 
the NSCAW sample frequently participated in state and federally supported approaches to 
build child welfare capacity. However, other sources indicate that the nature of these 
initiatives evolved during this time. For instance, states continued to use Title IV-E waivers 
to fund experiments in reducing reliance on foster care (www.childwelfare.gov), and in 2001 
the Children’s Bureau initiated quality improvement centers to develop and disseminate 
better evidence relating to children’s services (Collins-Camargo, Ensign, & Flaherty, 2008).
The continued salience of regulative and normative forces shaping local public child welfare 
practice supports the institutional theory prediction that organizations facing uncertainty 
about how to achieve core goals become subject to laws, regulations, and other coercive 
external influences as well as societal norms about what constitute legitimate ways of 
operating (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995). Institutional theory is especially 
applicable to child welfare agencies because of limited ability to predict which family 
dynamics will lead to child injury or death. In the absence of clear means–ends 
relationships, and because of the potentially horrific consequences of error, child welfare 
agencies are both subject to legal mandates and the focus of substantial scrutiny. While study 
findings cannot speak to the drivers of these regulative and normative forces, these results do 
suggest that they are stable aspects of the institutional environment surrounding current 
public child welfare practice.
Perhaps because of continuing pressure to increase public sector efficiency, over the past 
decade, local public child welfare agencies were increasingly situated in larger agencies that 
included mental health and public health departments. Being in the same agency may not 
entail co-location. In addition, not all local health departments provide health services. 
However, those health departments that do provide health care tend to focus on maternal and 
child health (NACCHO, 2011) as well as the underserved. In addition, common agency 
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auspices may facilitate expedited referral arrangements as well as agreements allowing 
information sharing when permitted by families. Thus, this trend bodes well in a 
combination of respects for addressing the substantial unmet physical and behavioral health 
needs of many families engaged in child welfare (Burns et al., 2004; GAO, 2013). Recent 
research has found increased numbers of children in the US receiving preventive services as 
well as decreased out-of-home rates (Gilbert, Parton, & Skivenes, 2011, citing CBS Statline/
Childprotection, 2010). These trends may both reflect and reinforce increasing structural 
integration between child protective services and other health and human services.
Another trend over 1999–2009 was increasing frequent use of both point-based actuarial and 
consensus-based guidelines to support risk assessment. Prior evidence has suggested that 
actuarial risk assessments have better predictive ability than consensus-based approaches 
(D’Andrade et al., 2008). However, concerns about legal liability for child welfare agencies 
as well as loss of investigator discretion appear to have led to a shift toward comprehensive 
and functional assessments. Currently, the Administration for Children and Families is 
encouraging agencies to use standardized and evidence-based functional assessments rather 
than point-based assessments of risk (ACF, 2013).
Viewed through the lens of institutional theory, child welfare agencies have recently faced 
competing normative pressures relative to risk assessment. The first is to demonstrate 
efficiency and accountability, for which purpose actuarial approaches are arguably superior. 
At the same time, consensus models reflect social work values of holistically appraising 
child contexts and honoring professional discretion. In practice, local public child welfare 
agencies appeared to incorporate both norms, via increased use of a combination of actuarial 
and guideline approaches to risk assessments. This pattern fits previous findings that 
community mental health centers facing competing mental health and substance abuse 
treatment norms tended to manage this conflict by adopting both (D’Aunno, Sutton, & Price, 
1991). This trend may also imply that agencies’ search for and use of assessment tools may 
reflect scientific evidence as well as strongly felt social demands.
In the broader national context of privatization, the frequent use by 2009 of subcontracting 
across key child protection functions is not surprising. However, it is striking that one out of 
five local child welfare agencies now subcontracts at least some investigations or 
assessments, which have long been viewed as a distinctly public function (McCullough & 
Schmitt, 2000). This may reflect subcontracting of non-investigative assessments for lower 
risk families in states employing differential response systems. In some states, these 
assessments are conducted by private agencies via contract, and the public agency retains 
responsibility for the reports that result in a determination of whether maltreatment occurred. 
However, we found it notable that investigations were also the only point for which child 
welfare directors in 2009 more frequently reported using risk assessment. This may reflect 
CPS efforts to ensure that private agencies are using systematic and defensible guidelines for 
any assessments affecting entry into the system.
In theory, subcontracting controls costs and motivates better quality through competition. 
However, the limited evidence available suggests that costs may sometimes both rise for 
states and exceed contractor expectations (Hubel, Schreier, Hansen, & Wilcox, 2013; Unruh 
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& Hodgkin, 2004). One potential reason may be a lack of competition. Contrary to this key 
assumption underlying privatization, localities often have a scarcity of qualified providers 
willing to serve challenging populations such as those involved with child welfare (Van 
Slyke, 2003). Even when there is competition initially, the very process of subcontracting 
tends to lead to less competition over time, as less successful agencies either close or merge 
into other agencies (Sclar, 2001), and contractors develop personal ties with public agencies 
and officials that further constrain choice among potential providers (Van Slyke, 2003). The 
assumption of competition is also premised on a credible threat of switching to alternative 
providers when performance does not meet expectations. Yet, given the critical nature of 
continuity in human services, and limited time available to coordinate with new partners, 
public agencies “exercise that option only in the most extreme circumstances” (Sclar, 2001, 
p. 92).
Another reason privatization may not save money is that the processes of structuring and 
monitoring subcontracts themselves are costly. Indeed, transaction cost economics theory 
(Williamson, 1981) implies that most services needed for families involved in child welfare 
might be more efficiently provided by public agencies than contracted out, because they are 
needed frequently; their outcomes are highly uncertain; and they require substantial 
investments in knowledge specific to this population, such as the roles of child welfare 
caseworkers, other designated advocates, courts, and other agencies (e.g., schools), and 
balancing recovery timelines with children’s need for permanence. Even amidst contracting 
out for service delivery, public child welfare agencies generally retain case-based authority 
over children and families in care, thus necessitating public–private agency coordination that 
can be difficult and costly.
Monitoring is further complicated by reliance on performance data from the subcontracted 
providers (Hasenfeld & Garrow, 2012). This problem may become more acute over time, as 
public agencies reduce staff in conjunction with outsourcing (Sclar, 2001). Among the 
attendant losses can be expertise critical to contract management (Van Slyke, 2003). In turn, 
when monitoring is incomplete, providers can actually be penalized for higher quality that 
does not translate into readily measurable contract metrics because such quality can increase 
their costs (Donahue, 1989).
Subcontracting also makes public child welfare agencies vulnerable to vicissitudes in local 
provider capacity. The recent proliferation of non-profits has yielded many – in some 
communities, literally hundreds of – small agencies with limited financial and staffing 
margins. When such providers close with little or no notice, child welfare agencies may be 
scrambling to fill in the gaps. As Milward and Provan (2000, p. 369) warn, “A system in 
flux will not be able to coordinate referrals or develop a stable system of services that clients 
need”. Indeed, evidence during the Great Depression that systems reliant on private 
providers were not sufficiently able to respond to increased need, particularly in areas with 
dense urban poverty, prompted the federal government’s initial assumption of responsibility 
for child protection through the Social Security Act of 1935 (Zullo, 2002).
Privatization may also weaken the public sector and its ability to advocate for vulnerable 
people in other ways. For instance, front line employees of private agencies generally have 
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lower compensation than comparable employees of public agencies, fewer vacation days, 
and less favorable working conditions (CBO, 2012; Donahue, 1989). Such employment 
contexts may exacerbate the very high turnover that already undermines continuity of human 
services for vulnerable families. Finally, privatization appears to be shifting private agencies’ 
focus from advocating for systemic change, such as reducing income inequality, to securing 
and maintaining government contracts (Hasenfeld & Garrow, 2012; Van Slyke, 2003). In 
public mental health services, privatization reduced some legal protections for clients, as the 
client became redefined from the individual to the purchasing agency (Schlesinger, Dorwart, 
& Pulice, 1986). In child welfare, the cumulative impact may be less collective advocacy for 
maltreated children and their families, and less legal authority to thereby invoke.
In sum, research is needed to examine the consequences of the growth of child welfare 
privatization for public and private agencies. This trend, if grounded in skepticism about the 
inherent worth of the public sector (Benson, 1975), may contribute to a vicious cycle of 
diminishing capacity, as public agencies lose needed public support and thus perhaps their 
distinctive recognizability and legitimacy as providing essential public human service 
functions (Heinrich, Lynn, & Milward, 2010; Kennedy, 2006; Milward & Provan, 2000). 
The overall systemic and client-level effects of public agencies transitioning from “steering 
and rowing” (Milward & Provan, 2000, p. 363) to “steering but not rowing” are essential to 
clarify.
Regardless of its consequences, the rising levels of subcontracting over 1999–2009 suggest 
that the private provision of child welfare services is here to stay. In the introduction to this 
symposium, McBeath et al. speculate that continued blurring of public–private boundaries 
could create greater interdependence and hence “incentives to develop interagency 
relationships characterized by reciprocity and trust” (p. XXXX). Despite increases in 
subcontracting with local service providers, child welfare agencies did not more frequently 
engage in formal coordination such as memoranda of understanding, joint staff training, or 
joint budgeting between 1999 and 2009. In fact, the few changes in frequencies of 
cooperation during this time were generally decreases. This contrast may suggest that 
despite increased reliance on local service providers to serve families, public child welfare 
agencies may not have been sharing power with other agencies more often. In other words, 
while public child welfare may “steer rather than row” services for children under their 
protection, they may still be alone at the steering wheel.
One possible reason for the stability of child welfare cooperation with other local human 
service agencies may be the high levels of activities with each type of partner already 
occurring by 1999. Another reason for the stable inter-agency cooperation may be child 
welfare agencies focusing management and front line staff time on the additional 
subcontracting initiated during that time, at the price of building more voluntary 
connections. Given the critical interdependencies among public human services, however, 
inter-agency ties such as memoranda of understanding and cross training that may improve 
communication merit continued attention. For instance, prior research has found that police 
can play a key role in investigations, enhancing CPS worker safety and preparing evidence 
for review by the courts. However, police often lack knowledge of child maltreatment, are 
trained in confrontational styles of interrogation that can be particularly inappropriate with 
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children, and may lack awareness of non-court options (Garrett, 2004). Joint training may 
help child welfare workers and the police understand and better draw on the distinctive 
strengths of each system.
Juvenile courts make decisions about removing youth from home and specifying services, 
and see among the most vulnerable youth engaged with child welfare. Previous authors have 
cited the need for comprehensive, integrated services of sufficient duration to address often 
complex needs. Inter-agency ties such as memoranda of understanding between child 
welfare and juvenile justice agencies may facilitate faster initial responses, and pooled 
funding may improve their flexibility to address sometimes rapidly changing child and 
family needs (Howell, Kelly, Palmer, & Mangum, 2004). Similarly, school staff can be 
invaluable partners in monitoring and supporting maltreated children when they have 
effective ties to child welfare. The Children’s Bureau has recently funded some school-based 
initiatives for children engaged with child welfare in the hope of improving these 
connections (Mitchell et al., 2012).
Overall, between 1999 and 2009 local public child welfare agencies appeared to adapt to 
demands for accountability and efficiency through some degree of agency integration, more 
frequent use of combined approaches to support critical decisions, and increased 
subcontracting. In turn, these adaptations may also shape the environment that child welfare 
agencies face (March & Sutton, 1997). By increasing connectivity with a range of local 
service providers, subcontracting may improve families’ access to some services and 
potentially allow more choices according to their preferences. At the same time, such 
contracts also embed child welfare agencies in a more complex array of partnerships 
requiring both management and front line staff attention, and may make child welfare 
services more vulnerable to shocks in any of those systems. One commonality appears to be 
increased demand on local child welfare agencies regardless of whether they are public or 
private. This line of reasoning highlights the importance of policymakers and funders 
providing sufficient administrative and programmatic resources for public and private child 
welfare agencies.
While NSCAW is the only repeated survey with detailed information about local public 
child welfare agencies of which we are aware, several methodological issues may limit the 
robustness of study findings. First, as noted, NSCAW’s sample was designed to yield a 
nationally representative sample of children involved with the US child welfare system, 
rather than of child welfare agencies. The majority of cases were sampled from agencies in 
the eight states with the largest child welfare populations; hence, while the sampling process 
did include selecting agencies of varying size and urbanicity, agencies in large states were 
over-represented in the study and findings may not be generalizable to agencies located in 
smaller states. Second, current study findings were based solely on responses from a single 
individual within the public child welfare agency, either the local agency director or another 
designated individual. While the items selected for this study address facets of agency 
context, structure, and policies for which directors were the most knowledgeable potential 
agency representatives, it is unlikely that one person had complete information or was able 
to represent the diversity of opinion present within agencies on these topics. Additionally, 
the insertion of the word “any” into the 2009 prompt about subcontracting raises the 
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possibility that some of the difference in frequency was due to representatives of agencies 
with consistent subcontracting practices answering “no” in 1999 because a service area was 
not predominantly subcontracted, and then “yes” in 2009 because they did subcontract some 
services in that area. Although this renders the change between 1999 and 2009 ambiguous, 
the magnitude of the differences seen in these data and their consistency with other recent 
findings (Collins-Camargo et al., 2011) suggest a trend toward privatization. Finally, the 
estimates presented in Table 1 reflect bivariate models testing for time-based differences; 
these findings are not able to establish the causes and correlates of time-based change vs. 
consistency. Future research is needed on this question.
5. Conclusions
Local public child welfare agencies discharge a vital mission within a complex web of 
environmental and organizational resources and obligations. Data from the only longitudinal 
national survey of families engaged with child welfare reveal that some key regulative and 
normative pressures on local child welfare agencies were largely stable between 1999 and 
2009. However, some aspects of local agencies’ administrative contexts and service delivery 
structures changed significantly during this time. Although a range of organizational theories 
apply to the complex dynamics of child welfare services, in this paper we have primarily 
used institutional theory to conceptualize the competing environmental forces affecting local 
CPS agencies and trends in child welfare practice. The picture that emerges is one of 
increasing embeddedness within other public and private local providers. Time will tell what 
the net results will be for the families they collectively seek to serve.
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